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INCOME TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
INCURRED IN UNSUCCESSFUL CRIMINAL DEFENSE
In the recent case of Tellier v. Commissioner I the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit overruled a long standing precedent by declaring
deductible litigation expenses arising out of the conduct of a business
regardless of the type or the outcome of the litigation. The taxpayer-
petitioner, a dealer in securities, had been tried and convicted of violations
of federal securities and mail fraud statutes growing out of his business
activities. He claimed an income tax deduction for expenditures in-
curred in his unsuccessful defense of the criminal proceeding. The Com-
missioner's disallowance of the deduction was sustained by the Tax Court.2
Sitting en banc, the court of appeals reversed unanimously, holding that
such expenses are "ordinary and necessary" within the meaning of sec-
tion 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and that no sharply
defined public policy is frustrated by allowing the deduction.
The 1954 Code allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses" incurred in carrying on a business or trade,3 in producing
or collecting income,4 or in managing and maintaining income producing
property.5 The statutory language has been construed to require only
(1) that the expenditure be directly connected with or proximately result
from the taxpayer's business or income producing activity; 6 (2) that the
1342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3118 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1965).
2 Walter F. Tellier, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062 (1963).
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §212(1).
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(2). The standards for "ordinary and necessary"
are the same with respect to both § 162 and § 212. See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore,
372 U.S. 39, 45 (1963); Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 373-74
(1945). However, § 212 was new in 1942, 56 Stat. 819, whereas the provisions of
§ 162 date back to the 1919 Code, 40 Stat. 1066, 1077. Since most of the cases relevant
to this Comment deal with business expenses, only deductions claimed under § 162
will be discussed explicitly. It should be understood that the same considerations are
applicable to expenses incurred in income producing activities outside the context of
a trade or business.
6E.g., Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928). There is a gen-
eral prohibition of deductions for personal expenses, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262,
which may become relevant in cases involving the deduction of legal fees. Thus,
although a suit threatens to injure the taxpayer in his business or income producing
capacity, his litigation expenses will be nondeductible if the origin and nature of the
suit are personal. See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) (wife's
claims against taxpayer's business assets successfully resisted in divorce action);
Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1932) (action for slander brought and
won by taxpayer). However, some courts have held expenses incurred in an un-
successful defense to be personal when they would have been allowed under § 162 if
the taxpayer had won, indicating that the actual ground of disallowance was public
policy. Compare Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 581 (1941) (unsuccessful attempt to expunge order of suspension of attorney
taxpayer from practice before Treasury Department); Tracy v. United States, 151
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expenditure be common and accepted in that type of business or activity; 7
and (3) that the expenditure be appropriate at the time or helpful to the
taxpayer.8 Just as the Code includes income derived from illegal activities
within gross income,9 so it imposes no requirement for deductions that
expenses be lawful or arise out of lawful activities."0 Nevertheless, the
courts have created a "public policy" exception to the statutory language
which forbids the deduction of certain expenses, otherwise "ordinary and
necessary," 11 involving or related to unlawful activities.
As articulated by the Supreme Court, the rule is that "a finding of
'necessity' cannot be made . . . if allowance of the deduction would frus-
trate sharply defined national or state policies 12 proscribing particular
Ct Cl. 618, 284 F.2d 379 (1960) (unsuccessful attempt to forestall tax evasion prose-
cution), and Henry L. Peckham, 40 T.C. 315 (1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.
1964) (doctor taxpayer convicted of performing criminal abortion), with Commissioner
v. People's-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1932) (taxpayer, director of
company, acquitted of income tax evasion), and John W. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958)
(charges of criminal assault while on job dismissed). Hereafter it will be assumed
that the expenditures in question are business expenses according to the -Supreme
Court's construction requiring only direct connection with or proximate result from
the taxpayer's business.
7 E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93 (1952) ; Commissioner v. Heininger,
320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943) ; Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) ; Welsh v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
8 E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, supra note 7, at 93-94; Commissioner v. Heininger,
.rupra note 7, at 471. These cases make it clear that the expenditure need not in fact aid
the business or result in the production of income. See Trust of Bingham v. Commis-
sioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945). Nevertheless, one ground relied on by the Tax Court
in disallowing legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense has been
that "the fees were not incurred in the actual production of the income of the . . .
business and did not enable . . . [the taxpayer] to continue his . . . business."
C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417, 1418 (1951). Here, as in some cases labeling such
expenses "personal," see note 6 supra, the court indulged in an improper interpreta-
tion of the Code to buttress its actual reliance upon a public policy outside the statute.
Compare note 11 infra.
9 United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927).
10 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943); Tellier v.
Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WE=K
3118 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1965) ; 50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams).
IL Some courts have accepted the argument that any illegal activity is extraordi-
nary and unnecessary, and thus that no expenditure occasioned by the activity can
be deemed ordinary and necessary. See, e.g., National Outdoor Advertising Bureau,
Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 1937); David R. Faulk, 26 T.C. 948,
951 (1956) ; Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214, 217 (1924). However, as the Second Circuit
has now recognized,
To the extent that the equation of illegality with extraordinary and un-
necessary is not question begging, it is applying special meanings to "ordinary
and necessary" which are not applied in other connections. So long as the
expense arises out of the conduct of the business and is a required outlay it
ought to be considered ordinary and necessary.
Tellier v. Commissioner, supra note 10, at 694; see Note, 54 HAv. L. REv. 852, 856-57
(1941); Note, 13 STAN. L. Rxv. 92, 98-99 (1960); Comment, 72 YA=E L.J. 108,
113 n.20 (1962). Of course, some expenditures, particularly those illegal or unethical
in themselves, may validly be disallowed as extraordinary if they are uncommon or
unaccepted ways of doing business. See, e.g., United Draperies, Inc. v. Commissioner,
340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 30 (1965) ; Reid, Disallowance
of Tax Deductions on Grounds of Public Policy-A Critique, 17 FEm. B.J. 575, 582-83
(1957) ; cf. Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1956) (dictum).
3
2 It is interesting that the Court and most commentators draw no distinction
between national and state policies, even though it might appear that the federal
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types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof."'18
The Court has found such frustration in only two types of cases: It has
upheld Treasury Regulations denying deductions for certain types of lobby-
ing expenses,' 4 and it has held that criminal fines may be disallowed.' 5
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has emphasized the intent of
the Code to tax net income regardless of its source.'" Thus it has held
government would have a more valid interest in deviating from the neutrality of the
Code to avoid the frustration of federal law than that of state law. One commentator
has suggested such a distinction with respect to the deductibility of expenditures
which are illegal per se. Lurie, Deductibility of "Illegal" Expenses, 11 N.Y.U. INsT.
oN FaD. TAx 1189, 1191( 1953).
IS Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958). (Foot-
note added.) Thus the Court would find the expense "unnecessary" as a matter of
law on public policy grounds, even though it might in fact be "necessary" as that word
is used in the Code. See note 11 supra. It appears that the "governmental declaration"
must be through legislation or in certain cases, see note 14 infra, through administra-
tive regulations with apparent congressional acquiescence. See Lilly v. Commissioner,
343 U.S. 90, 94-97 (1952); McDonald, Deduction of Attorneys' Fees for Federal
Income Tax Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 168, 179 (1954); cf. Schwartz, Business
Expenses Contrary to Public Policy: An Evaluation of the Lilly Case, 8 TAx L.
REv. 241, 248 (1953); Note, 51 CoLum. L. REv. 752 (1951).
14 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) ; Textile Mills Sec. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). In these cases the Regulations had been in
force for many years, and Congress was assumed to have acquiesced in them through
subsequent reenactments of the relevant code provisions. See Lilly v. Commissioner,
343 U.S. 90, 95 (1952). In addition, the lobbying cases uniquely involve the doctrine
that business men should not be allowed deductions unavailable to other taxpayers
undertaking similar activities. See generally Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1017 (1960).
15 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 30 (1958) ; Hoover Motor
Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) (alternative holding). The Court
has also indicated that expenditures which are in themselves illegal and which would
be so even if the taxpayer's business were lawful, compare text accompanying note 18
infra, should be disallowed because a direct frustration of the prohibiting statute
would result from their allowance. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
spra at 35 (dictum) ; cf. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1952) (dictum) ;
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927) (dictum). The lower courts
have so held without exception, including within the same rubric payments made
unethically to influence government officials. See, e.g., Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal
Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950
(1963) (payments in violation of state bribery law); Rugel v. Commissioner, 127
F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942) (payments for political influence to obtain public contracts) ;
Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955) (payments in violation of state
insurance law) ; Ralph Leonard Polk, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 51 (1948), aff'd sub nom.
Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949) ("protection" payments to
state and county officials by operators of gambling house). Compare note 17 infra
and accompanying text.
1' See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958) ; Commissioner v.
Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943); McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66-67
(1944) (Black, J., dissenting). Although taxable income for Code purposes is tech-
nically defined as gross income less allowable deductions, there was clearly a notion
of commercial net income in the minds of the framers of the income tax sections,
who intended, in crude terms, to tax "what . . . [an individual] has at the end of
the year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses." 50 CONG. Ruc.
3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams). See generally Keesling, Illegal Trans-
actions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 26 (1958) ; Paul, The Use of Public
Policy by the Commissioner in Disallozing Deductions, U. So. CAL. 1954 TAx INsT.
715; Reid, supra note 11.
Thus the common assertion that deductions are a matter of legislative grace, see,
e.g., Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940) ; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934), adds no force to the argument for deductibility on public
policy grounds. Congress did provide for the deduction of ordinary and necessary
business expenses and, as one commentator has said, deductions once allowed through
the "grace" of Congress are not a matter of judicial grace. Reid, supra note 11, at 581.
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that expenditures thought to be "immoral," but which do not violate the
criminal law, may be deducted if they are ordinary and necessary.1i The
Court has also held deductible amounts spent for rent and employees'
salaries in the conduct of an illegal gambling enterprise, even though the
payments themselves violated the state penal statute.'8 And, in Commis-
sion v. Heininger,"9 the Court held deductible legal fees incurred during
hearings before the Postmaster General which resulted during a fraud order
that threatened to destroy the taxpayer's business and in an unsuccessful
effort to obtain an injunction against the fraud order.
There had never been any doubt that a taxpayer might deduct legal
expenses arising from the unsuccessful defense of a civil action brought
by a private party, so long as it related to his business activities.20 The
Commissioner and, until the Tellier case, the courts have viewed Heininger
as extending deductibility only to situations involving administrative find-
ings of "guilt" or other government instituted civil proceedings which are
themselves inconclusive as to the guilt of the taxpayer.2 1 Thus they have
1 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). Lilly involved "kickbacks" to eye
doctors made by the optician taxpayers in conformance with widespread practice, but
in violation of professional standards of ethics. Such "immoral" expenditures had
previously been disallowed along with those made illegal through legislation. See
also note 15 supra.
18 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
19 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
20 See, e.g., Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1935) ; John W. Clark,
30 T.C. 1330 (1958). This allowance corresponded in general to the allowance of
amounts paid for primarily compensatory damages or settlements in private civil suits.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1936); Helvering v.
Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935). It now appears that the Commissioner will
allow all civil damages paid to private parties, including treble damages in antitrust
suits, without regard to their compensatory or punitive nature. See Rev. Rul. 64-224,
1964-2 Cum. BULL. 52, 113 U. PA. L. R-v. 954 (1965). A fortiori legal expenses
vill be allowed in such cases.
21 See Rev. Rul. 62-175, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 50; Commissioner v. Shapiro, 278
F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959) ;
Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C.
314 (1945), acq., 1945 CuM. BULL. 3; Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310
(1944), acq. in part, 1944 Cum. BULL. 18 (as to allowance of attorneys' fees in civil
antitrust action brought by state government), rev'd in part, 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) (as to allowance of settlement payment to the state).
But see David R. Faulk, 26 T.C. 948 (1956) (disallowing both attorneys' fees and
double damages in civil suit brought by federal government) ; cf. Bell v. Commissioner,
320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963) (disallowance of attorneys' fees involved in appearances
before C.P.A. disciplinary boards after taxpayer's conviction of crime); Estate of
Buder, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 300 (1963), aff'd on other issues, 330 F.2d 441 (8th
Cir. 1964) (disallowance of fees spent in unsuccessfully resisting disbarment proceed-
ings); Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956) (the same).
The Longhorn case, supra, exemplifies the rare situation in which essentially
"penal" payments to the government have been held nondeductible when legal expenses
were allowed. See note 28 infra and accompanying text Before Heininger, both
amounts paid as civil damages to the government and legal fees incurred in unsuccessful
civil suits or administrative hearings against the government were nonductible. See,
e.g., Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941); National Outdoor Ad-
vertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937). Since Heininger,
"compensatory" payments to the government, and consequently legal fees, have been
allowed where the taxpayer's violation was unintentional and the statute was so
administered as to impose punitive damages on willful violators only. See, e.g.,
United States v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 240 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Jerry Rossman
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continued to apply the rule established by the Second Circuit in Burroughs
Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner,2 a pre-Heininger case overruled by
the Tellier decision, that legal expenses incurred in criminal proceedings
resulting in the taxpayer's conviction may not be deducted as ordinary
and necessary business expenses.23
In Burroughs the taxpayer had claimed deductions for the fine im-
posed by the state trial court in a criminal prosecution for antitrust viola-
tions, as well as for the legal fees expended on the unsuccessful defense.
Refusing to distinguish between these two types of expenses,2 4 the Second
Circuit disallowed both on the basis of a general public policy against
sanctioning expenditures occasioned by illegal activities.25 The Supreme
Court's later agreement with the Second Circuit as to the nondeductibility
of fines was based on its more limited "frustration" doctrine.2 6 The Court
repudiated the broad rationale of Burroughs, declaring that "the mere fact
that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act" does not
make it nondeductible. 7 Nevertheless, the courts have continued to link
attorneys' fees with fines without examining whether the allowance of fees
would have the same "frustration" effect on governmentally declared poli-
cies as that attributed to fines by the Supreme Court, and have generally
disallowed the fees whenever the payment of the penalty itself would have
been disallowed
2 8
Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949); Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v.
United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 390, 163 F. Supp. 620 (1958); cf. Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1958) (dictum). But see McGraw-Edison
Co. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 590, 300 F.2d 453 (1962).
2247 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
23 See, e.g., Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Acker v. Com-
missioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), taxpayer's petition for cert. denied, 358 U.S.
940 (1959) ; Standard Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., Inc., 40 T.C. 858 (1963) ; Henry
L. Peckham, 40 T.C. 315 (1963), aff'd on alternative grounds, 327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.
1964) ; Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956) ; C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417 (1951) ;
Simon Bloom, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 517 (1948); Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C.
801 (1947) ; Commissioner v. Shapiro, 278 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1960) (dictum);
Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166, 167-68 (6th Cir. 1959) (dictum).
24 "If the fines and costs cannot be deducted, the legal expenses incurred in
litigating the question whether the taxpayer violated the law and whether fines should
be imposed should naturally fall with the fines themselves." Burroughs Bldg. Material
Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931). In most cases, as in Tellier,
the courts were referring primarily to attorneys' fees when they spoke of "legal
expenses." However, it would seem that expenditures for such items as transcripts
and the taking of depositions should be grouped with attorneys' fees, and thus that
they are included in the holding of the Tellier case. On the other hand, the Burroughs
court may have been justified in its classification of court costs with fines, indicated
in the above quotation. See Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12
TAx L. REV. 241, 273 (1957). The various considerations which would apply in
determining the deductibility of different types of litigation expenses will not be
considered here; "legal expenses" will hereafter refer only to attorneys' fees, which
indeed constitute the most significant expenditure incurred in litigation.
2Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 24, at 180.
.26 Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) ; Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); see note 13 supra and accom-
panying text.
27 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943).
28 See Note, 13 STAN. L. REv. 92, 102 (1960). The only exception has been
where the state or national government has recovered a civil settlement payment from
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It is against this association of legal fees with penalties that the
majority of commentators have argued.2 9 They claim that expenses in-
curred in an unsuccessful criminal defense are more closely allied with
expenses which are held deductible even though incurred in the conduct
of illegal business activities. If the gambling establishment is entitled to
deduct its rent payments, it is argued, the proprietor of a lawful business
should be able to deduct the expense of defending against criminal charges
which threaten his business.30 Not only are attorneys' fees so expended
lawful, but the sixth amendment makes their expenditure a right the
deterrence of which could never be a valid public policy.31
This line of argument appears to contain several fallacies. It is of
course true that conducting a lawful defense cannot be deemed an
activity frustrating public policy, but neither can the payment of a fine
by a convicted defendant. In the case of fines, frustration of public
policy would occur if taxpayers were encouraged by deductibility to
commit illegal acts.3 2 Similarly, allowing a deduction for the cost of
defending a prosecution-and perhaps rendering that cost negligible in the
case of the high income defendant-might encourage taxpayers to take
the risk of being caught in illegal activities 3 3 or encourage bad faith
the taxpayer which has been considered "penal" and thus nondeductible. See Com-
missioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 728 (1945) ; cf. Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C. 314 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BuLL.
3. The attorneys' fees in such a case are deductible because directly covered by the
holding of Heininger. See note 21 sipra and accompanying text.
29 E.g., Arent, Deductibility of Penalties and Related Expenses, 2 AM. U. TAX
INST. 373, 381 (1949) ; Brookes, supra note 24, at 268; Krassner, Can a Deduction for
Legal Fees Be Against Public Policy?, 26 TAXES 447, 448 (1948) ; Lamont, Contro-
versial Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses, 42 TAXES 808, 823-24
(1964) ; McDonald, supra note 13, at 180; Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 852, 856 (1941) ;
Note, 13 STAN. L. REV. 92, 102 (1960). It should be noted that all of these writers
would disallow the deduction of criminal penalties. On the other hand, there are
those who would abolish any public policy exception to the language of the Code
and allow deduction even of fines, contrary to the holdings of the Supreme Court,
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Hoover Motor
Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) (alternative holding), and who
thus find it unnecessary to make such a distinction. E.g., Paul, supra note 16, at
736-37; cf. Keesling, supra note 16, at 35-37; Reid, supra note 11, at 578, 581. An
evaluation of the existing rule denying the deduction of fines and penalties is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
30 E.g., Brookes, supra note 24, at 269; Sultan, Income Tax Deductibility of
Expenses Relating to Illegal Activity, 19 TAx L. REV. 109, 116 (1963); Note, 13
STAN. L. REV. 92, 99 (1960).
31 See, e.g., Winokur, Deductibility of Legal and Other Professional Fees, U.
So. CAL. 1963 TAX INsT. 457, 504; Note, 13 STAN. L. REv. 92, 101 (1960). See also
notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text.
32 Or, perhaps more significantly, statutory policy would be frustrated if deducti-
bility allowed them to avoid part or all of the penal sanction. See notes 43-46 infra
and accompanying text. That taxpayers are encouraged by deductibility to commit
illegal acts is a debatable premise and one hardly capable of testing; however, de-
ductibility would seem no less likely to encourage violations in some cases than would
a lessening of the penalty itself.
33 Although this would generally result only if the criminal law provided insuffi-
cient penalties or inadequate enforcement, such reasoning is no less valid than the
usual rationalization for the disallowance of illegal expenses, see note 15 supra, that
allowance would encourage and render more profitable such expenditures, see, e.g.,
280 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
defenses.3 4 Thus, if the allowance of fines is assumed to frustrate the
deterrent function of a penal statute, so might the allowance of litigation
fees, which allowance might be deemed to frustrate an additional policy
against unconscionable defenses.
The commentators further argue that the Commissioner's and courts'
conclusion that Heininger distinguishes between criminal and civil suits 3
is absurd, that the defendant's tax liability should not depend upon the
manner in which the Government chooses to institute its nontax claim
against him.3 6 But, although it does not appear that the Supreme Court
in Heininger intended that the case turn on the civil-criminal distinction,
the importance which the Court attached to the difference is clearly indi-
cated in its own statement of its holding: "the Board of Tax Appeals was
not required to regard the administrative finding of guilt . . . as a rigid
criterion of the deductibility of respondent's litigation expenses." 37 The
Court indicated that the crux of this distinction was the availability to the
taxpayer convicted at a criminal trial of constitutional safeguards unavail-
able at administrative or other civil proceedings. Thus only after a crim-
inal conviction would it have been appropriate in the Court's view to
classify him as personally "guilty." 38
Thus viewed, the civil-criminal dichotomy suggests further similari-
ties, generally ignored by the commentators, between fines and legal fees
for purposes of deductibility. The argument has been advanced against
the public policy exception in general that it is outside the competence of
the Commissioner and Tax Court to determine, often years later, the
Arent, supra note 29, at 385-86; Krassner, supra note 29, at 448; Stapleton, The
Supreme Court Redefines Public Policy, 30 TAXEs 641 (1952); Note, 51 CoLum.
L. REv. 752, 758 (1951). Thus the question arises whether imperfections in nontax
law should be allowed to justify positive action through the tax laws. Compare notes
41-42 infra and accompanying text
34 See, e.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir.
1949) (L. Hand, J.) (dictum); Note, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 752, 757 (1951). On the
other hand, it is argued that disallowance may encourage prolonged litigation in the
hopes of acquittal and discourage compromises. See, e.g., Comment, 72 YALE L.J.
108, 135 (1962); 65 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1108, 1114 (1965). This may indeed be true
with respect to penalties, see Universal Atlas Cement Co., 9 T.C. 971, 976 (1947)
(dictum), aff'd per curiam, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962
(1949), but it seems clear that legal fees expended in the process of arriving at a
compromise which does not involve an admission of guilt on the part of the taxpayer
are deductible, see, e.g., Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956);
Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C. 314 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL. 3; Longhorn Portland
Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310 (1944), acq. in part, 1944 CuM. BULL. 18, rev'd in part, 148
F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) ; Universal Atlas Cement Co.,
supra, at 975 (dictum).
It has been suggested that a distinction be made between good and bad faith de-
fenses, see McDonald, supra note 13, at 181-82; Note, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 752, 757
(1951) ; however, such a determination, if not clearly beyond the competence of the
Commissioner, would create serious administrative problems, see Comment, 72 YALE
L.J. 108, 135 (1962). Compare notes 58-62 infra and accompanying text
35 See note 21 upra and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Brookes, supra note 24, at 264; cf. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d
690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965).
37 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943).
a8 Id. at 474.
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legality of a taxpayer's activities or expenditures. 39 However, where the
taxpayer has already been convicted-as would always be the case with
respect to claims for the deduction of attorneys' fees unsuccessfully ex-
pended as well as of fines, but not necessarily with respect to other types
of expenses connected with unlawful activities 4o-the illegality has already
been conclusively determined. A related argument against the general
public policy exception involves the inappropriateness of judicially amend-
ing the Code to prosecute or harass suspected criminals who cannot be
reached through state or federal penal laws.41 But with respect to attor-
neys' fees expended by a convicted man, just as with the fine he was re-
quired to pay, disallowance could have no such ulterior motive; the criminal
has already been caught and punished.4
One frequently mentioned distinction between fines and legal fees,
however, appears to stand up under scrutiny: Litigation expenses are not
part of the criminal sanction. Their disallowance adds a punitive conse-
quence, not prescribed by the penal law, which varies with the amount
necessary for conducting a defense rather than with the severity of the
crime, and which consequently may be unduly harsh relative to the statu-
tory penalty.43 The Supreme Court has characterized the allowance of fines
as "a device to avoid the consequence of violations of a law"; 44 the allow-
ance of attorneys' fees does not so frustrate the punitive function of penal
39 See, e.g., Reid, =pra note 11, at 578; Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 124-25
(1962).
40 See, e.g., Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315
F.2d 439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963) (affirming determination by
district court where suit brought for tax refund that expenditure violative of state
statute); United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 943 (1959) (the same, with respect to prohibition statute unenforced by state).
41 See, e.g., Lurie, sutpra note 12; Reid, supra note 11. The use of tax evasion
prosecutions to halt the careers of elusive racketeers appears to be a generally accepted
procedure. Most cases, however, are based on the taxpayer's failure to report a large
part of his income from illegal sources. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319
U.S. 503 (1943) ; Schuermann v. United States, 174 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 831 (1949). Such prosecutions would seem to be an appropriate function
of the Internal Revenue Service. See Paul, supra note 16, at 737. On the other
hand, it appears indefensible to contemplate, as some writers have done, see, e.g.,
Baker, Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime, 29 CHL-K.l'T L. Rxv. 197, 217-21
(1951) ; cf. Comment, 39 CALnF. L. REv. 226 (1951), the use of the judicially created
public policy exception to prosecute or harass the racketeer who actually reports and
pays taxes on his "commercial net income." Such an approach would most likely
ensnare many innocuous violators of complicated trade regulations and might, in fact,
frustrate the intent of the framers of the Internal Revenue Code. See note 16 .mpra
and accompanying text. See generally Paul, supra; 97 CONG. Rzc. 12230-44 (1951).
42 Of course, to those advocating use of the tax laws for criminal law enforcement,
who are primarily interested in disallowing the expenses of an unlawful business,
this might provide one reason for allowing the deduction, at least in the case of the
taxpayer conducting a legitimate business.
43 See, e.g., Krassner, supra note 29, at 448; Note, 51 CoLum. L. Rxv. 752, 757
(1951); Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 852, 856 (1941); Note, 13 STAN. L. REV. 92, 102
(1960); cf. Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 126-27 (1962). The Supreme Court has
alluded to the inappropriateness of attaching to the taxpayer's activities "a serious
punitive consequence" not intended by the legislation under which the nontax claim
was brought. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474-75 (1943).
44 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
282 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:274
legislation.45 On the contrary, their disallowance may be thought to frus-
trate the policy embodied in the legislative determination of particular
sanctions,46 as well as the more general policy that sanctions be known in
advance and that they be the same for all similar violators.
In any case, the Supreme Court's frustration doctrine requires only
that allowance of a deduction not frustrate public policy; it demands neither
that the allowance positively aid law enforcement or further any other
public policy nor that disallowance would be detrimental. This require-
ment would seem to be satisfied by the possibility of a neutrality in the
administration of the tax laws vis-a-vis criminal legislation 4 7 The allow-
ance of litigation expenses cannot fairly be said either to hinder the effec-
tiveness or administration of the criminal law or to bestow any undue
"benefit" on the taxpayer.48 This alone would seem sufficient to justify
the Second Circuit's decision in the Tellier case.
Nevertheless, as the court of appeals indicated briefly in Tellier,49
some positive justification for its decision can be found through reference
to the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments
to the Constitution.50 First, the disallowance of attorneys' fees might dis-
courage some taxpayers from defending against criminal charges. Although
the courts at the time of Burroughs 1 might have felt justified in replying
that such would be a proper result, since primarily bad faith or unrea-
sonable defenses would be deterred,52 the current view of an unqualified
45 Indeed, this point alone might be considered to compel deductibility if Sullivan,
=Pra note 44, is read to imply that an otherwise "ordinary and necessary" expense
must be allowed unless the allowance mitigates the penal sanction, the expenditure
is illegal per se, or allowance is explicitly prohibited by the Code or by a Treasury
Regulation which has gained congressional approval.
46Cf. Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 127 (1962): "[T]he sanctional provisions of
statutes . . . are as integral a part of the federal or state policy toward these
[illegal] activities as the proscription itself."4 7 Neutral application of a graduated income tax is an elusive concept. One
writer thinks neutrality impossible in the case of fines, taking the position that allow-
ance decreases the prescribed sanction while disallowance increases the sanction by
the amount of the additional tax liability. See Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 117
(1962). Of course, either deductibility or nondeductibility will favor some taxpayers
over others with respect to the actual burden of the fine. Nevertheless, it seems that,
as in the case of attorneys' fees, the deductibility of fines would result in the only
type of "neutrality" possible, i.e., the impact on a taxpayer in a given income bracket
would be the same relative to his actual net income after taxes as it would to his
net income if there were no income tax at all.
48 See, e.g., Keesling, supra note 16, at 35. There is no real "benefit" in the
so-called "subsidy" of the violator's defense which some courts have emphasized.
See, e.g., C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417, 1418 (1951); Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949) (dictum).
49 342 F.2d at 694.
50A concurring opinion by Chief Judge Lumbard joined by Judges Waterman
and Kaufman-all of whom joined also in the opinion of the court by Judge Hays-
was devoted to this point. 342 F.2d at 695-96.
5 1 Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931);
see text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
52 See, e.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949)
(dictum) ; cf. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878,
881 (2d Cir. 1937) ("If it is never necessary to violate the law in managing a busi-
ness, it cannot be necessary to resist a decree in equity forbidding violations, except
in cases where an injunction is unjustified.").
DEDUCTIBILITY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
right to counsel casts doubt on any other policy which might conflict
with it.P Further, most litigation fees are attributable to a time when
the defendant was presumptively innocent; the subsequent rebuttal of this
presumption would not seem retroactively to change the nature of the
expenditure made in pursuance of a constitutional right. The sixth and
fourteenth amendments do not compel the allowance of deductions for
expenses incurred in defending criminal prosecutions; 5 it is unlikely
that a new Code provision disallowing such deductions in the case of an
unsuccessful defense would be deemed unconstitutional. However, once
the attorneys' fees are conceded to be "ordinary and necessary" but for
considerations of public policy, the national policy embodied in the right
to counsel would seem to be furthered by allowing the deduction.55
In addition, apparent injustice would result from disallowance where
the convicted taxpayer has conducted a good faith defense. Frequently an
accused does not know whether he is guilty until the judgment is handed
downY6 Although it can be argued that such a person is a victim of the
penal statutes rather than the tax law, a certain amount of vagueness and
uncertainty in criminal legislation must be accepted as inevitable. Dis-
allowance may also seem unjust as to the taxpayer who is found guilty
of only one or some of several counts, or who is convicted of a crime of
lesser degree than that charged in the indictment. Although some courts
have attempted to solve this problem by crediting a portion of the tax-
payer's litigation expenses to his partial success and disallowing the rest,57
such apportionment can be carried out only at the cost of administrative
difficulty and an unavoidable element of arbitrariness.5 8
Indeed, administrative difficulties and seeming inequities provided the
court in Tellier with a major justification for its decision. The court
alluded to the "anomalous, arbitrary, artificial and conflicting results" to
53 Cf., e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Although there may
be a valid policy against unreasonable and bad faith defenses, as indicated, for example,
by the practice of encouraging guilty pleas and settlements, the right to counsel does
not depend on innocence or the reasonableness of the defense. See Tellier v. Com-
missioner, 342 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion).
54 Cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) ; Walter F. Tellier, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062, 1071 (1963) (rev'd, Tellier
v. Commissioner, supra note 53).
55 See, e.g., Arent, supra note 29, at 382; Brookes, supra note 24, at 267-68;
KIrassner, supra note 29, at 448; Winokur, supra note 31; Note, 13 STAN. L. RLv.
92, 101-02 (1960) ; Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 135-36 (1962).
56 See, e.g., Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947). This problem arises
particularly in the type of case most likely to involve a business claim for the allow-
ance of litigation expenses-that involving trade regulation. See generally Paul,
supra note 16, at 736; Note, 54 HA.v. L. Rxv. 852, 856 (1941) ; Comment, 72 YALE
LJ. 108, 135 (1962).
67 See, e.g., National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878,
881 (2d Cir. 1937).
58 Cf., e.g., J. Reuel Campbell, CCH TAx CT. REP. (TAx CT. Mms. 1965-54)
Dec. No. 27,284 (1965). Compare Standard Coat, Apron & Linen Service, Inc., 40 T.C.
858 (1963), where the taxpayer's initial conviction was reversed, but the Tax Court
refused to allow a deduction for any litigation expenses because of a subsequent nolo
contendere plea.
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which adherence to the Burroughs rule had led,59 then recounted the vari-
ous types of tenuous borderline distinctions-between criminal and civil
proceedings,.0 guilt and innocence, 6 and trial and pretrial expenses. 62
The new rule announced by the Second Circuit will, of course, leave some
administrative difficulties and anomalies remaining in the application of
the public policy exception, particularly where attorneys' fees blend into
the area of illegal or unethical expenditures. s  Thus the next step-after
upholding and following the Tellier case-would seem to be a clarification
of the issue of the deductibility of expenditures which have heretofore been
considered in themselves against public policy.64
69 342 F2d at 694.
60 Compare text accompanying notes 36-39 mpra.
61 For example, where a plea of nolo contendere was made for valid business
reasons by a defendant subsequently determined to have been innocent, attorneys' fees
have been disallowed. Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963). The
Tax Court has held, on the other hand, that attorneys' fees expended in the settlement
of criminal charges of tax evasion are deductible. Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C 314
(1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BuLL. 3.
62 This problem occurs most often with respect to convictions for tax evasion,
where the taxpayer has attempted to persuade the government to seek only civil
redress or has otherwise employed an attorney for investigatory services previous to
indictment Allocation has been made to allow a deduction for fees attributable to
preindictment efforts. E.g., Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F. 2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959) ;
Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956). But see Tracy v. United
States, 151 Ct Cl. 618, 284 F.2d 379 (1960).
3Examples would be cases in which the taxpayer employs an attorney to help
him conceal illegal business activities or in which the defense of a criminal charge
is conducted unethically.
64 See note 15 supra.
